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Beyond Yucca Mountain:




After fifteen years and six billion dollars, the United States still lacks a viable
long-term solution to the mounting levels of high-level nuclear waste scattered
across the nation in 68 sites.' The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA")
and its 1987 Amendments have driven regulators to approve Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, for burial of the 37,000 metric tons of nuclear waste in need of a final
resting place. In the NWPA, Congress set January 31, 1998 as the deadline by
which the Department of Energy ("DOE") was to dispose of the utilities' nu-
clear waste.2 However, litigation challenges, scientific uncertainty, and political
stalemates have all contributed to extensive delays. At present, the best case sce-
nario for when Yucca Mountain can accept the waste is in the year 2010?
Correctly anticipating DOE's inability to meet the 1998 deadline, Congress
and the utilities both tried to position themselves for the unfortunate conse-
quences. Congress attempted to mitigate the situation through the passage of
various bills that mandate shipping the waste through 34 states to get it to an
t. Amy Sypula is a J.D. candidate at the University of Chicago. She received her B.A. from
the University of Chicago. She would like to thank Dr. Theodore Steck, Dr. John Simpson,
Jeffrey Rachlinski, and her parents for their insights, comments, and time.
1. US Department of Energy (US DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment, Viabihi Assessment of a Repositogy at Yucca Mountain: Overiew, DOE/RW-0508 (December
1998), 4.
2. 42 USC § 10222(a)(5)(B) (1983).
3. US DOE, Viabih i Assessment at 3 (cited in note 1).
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interim storage site near Yucca Mountain.4 But the Administration feared the
creation of a de facto permanent site above ground. Scientists did not want to be
rushed into a decision with the potential for such grave consequences. To add to
the opposition, the public protested what became known as "Mobile Chernobyl
bills." After three failed attempts to ensure a veto-proof majority, the House of
the 106th Congress has been forced to introduce a fourth version of their re-
placement to the NWPA.5
Utilities, on the other hand, dealt with this delay through alternative means:
the civil litigation system. In Indiana Michigan Power Co v Department of Energy C'In-
diana Michigan"), utilities and state commissions sought review of the Department
of Energy's ("DOE") final interpretation, declaring itself free from any obliga-
tion to dispose of high-level radioactive waste in the absence of an operational
permanent or interim repository.6 Rejecting the DOE's statutory construction,
the D.C. Circuit found that DOE's obligation to dispose of the utilities' waste by
January 31, 1998 was not conditioned on the existence of a repository or other
facility.7 This holding prevents the DOE from excusing itself from liability de-
spite Yucca Mountain's 1998 inoperational status. This same decision left the
title to the waste with the utilities and created a form of shared liability.
Such a shared liability may be just what is needed to spark some action in the
near term nuclear waste dilemma. Both the utilities and the DOE have been so
focused upon the approval process for Yucca Mountain, they have been unable
to reach an agreement on the more immediate problem of what to do with the
waste for the next 11 years during which Yucca will not be available. Although
both sides have a vested interest in the success of a permanent repository at
Yucca Mountain, their conflicting motivations have prevented any consensus
from forming to solve the immediate problem of interim storage. The nuclear
power industry perceives Yucca's approval as imperative not only to their future
success, but also to their very existence. Similarly, the DOE wants Yucca to suc-
ceed to improve their poor track record concerning hazardous waste treatment
and justify the time and money invested in the site.8 While both sides are united
in their determination to safely dispose of waste at Yucca Mountain, this deter-
mination has simultaneously impeded progress on interim plans for the nuclear
waste. The DOE has scheduled a definitive decision to be available on Yucca's
feasibility by 2001.9 Regardless of whether Yucca Mountain is then chosen to
host all of the nation's nuclear waste, there are over 30,000 tons of spent nuclear
4. HR 1020, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995); S 1271, 104th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 25,
1995); S 1936, 104th Cong, 2d Sess (Jul 10, 1995); HR 1270, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 10,
1997); S 104, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 21, 1997).
5. HR 45, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 6, 1999).
6. 88 F3d 1272, 1274 (DC Cir 1996).
7. Id at 1277.
8. For stories related to DOE's radioactive leaks at their Hanford Site, see Paul Hersch, ed,
Fluor Daniel Hanford Fined for Nu/ear-Safey Violations, SolidWaste News (Apr 1, 1998).
<http://news.solidwaste.com/firms-and-faces/19980401-913.html>; John Stang, Hanford Con-
firms More Tank Leaks, Tri-City Herald (Jan 16, 1998); Danny Westneat, Shadow Over New Hanford
Operators: Fluor Under Probe In Ohio Cleanup, Seattle Times (Aug 7, 1996).
9. US DOE, Viability Assessment at 3 (cited in note 1).
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fuel that need to be dealt with until 2010, its earliest availability. This Comment
will argue that the Court's decision in Indiana Michigan has provided both sides
with the prompting necessary to find solutions to the interim nuclear waste
problem.
This Comment consists of five Parts. Part One explores the background of
the nation's nuclear waste policy and Yucca Mountain. Part Two examines some
of the reasons for the continual delays in constructing a permanent repository at
Yucca Mountain as the precursors to the Indiana Michigan suit. Part Three sets
forth an analysis of case law dealing with the DOE's liability for not meeting the
January 1998 deadline. Part Four considers the impact that these legal holdings
will have on the near-term nuclear waste dilemma. Specifically, the liability for
disposal as distinct from taking title to the spent fuel, the corresponding financial
ramifications, and incentives for near-term action will be addressed. Part Five
concludes with an evaluation of potential remedies that will provide near-term
solutions. By shifting the expectations of the parties and balancing the liability
between DOE and the utilities, the D.C. Circuit may have provided the needed
impetus to break the current stalemate. Instead of a Yucca Mountain-focused
approach to nuclear policy, the parties may realize that compromise and alterna-
tive strategies are also necessary to provide assurance to the industry, the DOE,
and the public that the nuclear waste will be safely contained in the short-term as
well.
I. BACKGROUND OF NUCLEAR WASTE AND YUCCA MOUNTAIN
The United States currently has 105 operating nuclear power plants that store
waste at 68 sites.10 They supply over 20 percent of our nation's electric power,
second only to coal.11 Nuclear power has been championed as a "cleaner" energy
source in comparison to burning fossil fuels, which emit harmful pollutants into
the atmosphere. However, the challenges associated with its "unclean" high-level
nuclear waste or spent nuclear fuel have been underestimated. The nuclear in-
dustry and the government have long been contemplating strategies for the safe
treatment of nuclear waste including reprocessing, vitrification, closed-system
reactors, and underground burial. What was not foreseen, however, was the ex-
tent of difficulty associated with the siting and construction of such a nuclear
waste facility, which has resulted in our current inability to handle its long-term
disposal.
Ninety-nine percent of high-level waste from commercial nuclear power
plants is simply spent nuclear fuel (SNE) that has released its energy through
fission.12 This energy is used to boil water into steam, which drives a turbine-
10. Mark Holt and Zachary Davis, Nuclear Energy Pofiy, CRS Issue Brief CRS-88090 (Cong
Research Serv, April 21, 1999). <http://www.cnie.org/ne/eng-5.html>.
11. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Reactors (visited April 14, 1999)
<http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/reactors.html>.
12. Harold Lines, High-Level Nuclear Waste: A S*, Permanent Solution, US Council on Energy
Awareness (Sept 16, 1996) <http://www.indirect.com/user/hlines/highlev.htm>.
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generator to produce electricity. The fuel that runs nuclear power plants is made
up of small uranium pellets or MOX (a mixture of uranium and plutonium).
These are placed inside long metal fuel rods. These rods are grouped together
into fuel assemblies, which are placed inside the reactor.
Certain changes take place in the fuel during the fission process. Most of the
fragments of the fission-the pieces left over after the atom has split-are ra-
dioactive. Over time, the uranium and plutonium are burned up and these
trapped fission fragments reduce the efficiency of the chain reaction. Therefore,
about every 18 months, the old fuel assemblies, having already released their
energy, are removed and replenished with fresh fuel.13
After it is removed from the reactor, used fuel is stored at nuclear plant sites
in steel-lined, concrete vaults filled with water. The water cools the used fuel and
acts as a shield to protect workers from radiation. The radioactive waste remains
locked inside the uranium pellets, which are still encased in the metal fuel rods.14
This form of storage only provides a temporary solution, however, since the
effective life span of the pools is much less than the 10,000 to 100,000 years that
some of the wastes remain radioactive. Another factor which limits the feasibility
of short term solutions is the sheer amount of waste generated by a typical nu-
clear power plant: about 30 tons of used fuel each year. 5 To provide a better
sense of this volume, the used fuel produced by all of America's nuclear power
plants since the first one started operating over 30 years ago would cover an area
the size of a football field about fifteen feet deep.16
In response to the growing number of spent fuel rods that are piling up at the
individual reactors, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.17 It
requires the DOE to site, construct, and operate a deep geological repository for
the disposal of high-level nuclear waste.'8 In doing so, the government provided
a large subsidy to the nuclear energy industry. This incentive allowed the utilities
to gain all of the financial benefits of nuclear power while avoiding most of the
long-term costs. As amended in 1987, the NWPA provides that Yucca Moun-
tain, Nevada is the sole area to be evaluated as a potential site for the first per-
manent waste dump. 19 Located in a dry climate 100 miles north of Las Vegas,
this permanent repository would consist of a series of tunnels to be drilled deep
into a geologic structure, with each tunnel containing bore holes into which
waste containers will be placed. "If approved, the site will consist of approxi-
mately 150 miles of service and storage tunnels 1,400 feet below Yucca Moun-
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, CRS Issue Brief IB92059 at CRS-7 (Cong
Research Serv, July 19, 1996).
16. Harold Lines, Higb-LevelNuclear Waste (cited in note 12).
17. 42 USC % 10101-10270 (1982).
18. 42 USC § 10131(b)(1).
19. Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments. Subchapter I-Disposal and Storage of High-
Level Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Low-Level Radioactive Waste. Part E-
Redirection of the Nuclear Waste Program. Selection Of Yucca Mountain Site, 42 USC § 10172
(1987).
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tain."20 The waste will be taken to the site and reloaded into storage containers.
From there, it will be placed inside another container for transport down into the
tunnels. Locomotives will pull the containers into the tunnels, and robots will
monitor the site for 100 years. "The containers, made of corrosion-resistant
stainless steel and designed to shield radiation from the environment for 1000
years, would provide an extra, engineered barrier to augment the geologic barrier.
After the containers are placed into individual bore holes, the holes would be
sealed with a liner and dosed at the surface."21
In the NWPA, Congress created a comprehensive scheme for the interim
storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated by
civilian nuclear power plants. NWPA establishes that, in return for a payment of
fees by the utilities, DOE will construct a repository for the SNF, with the utili-
ties who generate the waste bearing the primary responsibility for interim storage
until DOE accepts the SNF "in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter."22 The NWPA does this by requiring that the utilities enter into standard
contracts with DOE for the disposal of the waste. According to Section
302(a)(5) of the statute, the contracts shall provide that the Secretary take title to
and dispose of the waste, beginning not later than January 31, 1998.23 The final
standard contract adopted by DOE, following notice and comment, states that
[t]he services to be provided by DOE under this contract shall begin, after
commencement of facility operations, not later than January 31, 1998 and shall
continue until such time as all SNF ... from the cvilian nuclear power reactors
specified ... has been disposed of04
This statutory and contractual commitment is the source of the current con-
troversy.
II. REASONS FOR THE DELAY OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN
As legal, scientific, and political issues erupted, it became dear that DOE
would not meet the 1998 deadline. Although these issues may not prove to be
deal breakers in other contexts, the high stakes of the nuclear waste dilemma
allow for little bargaining room. This repository at Yucca will influence the
health and safety of the public at large, the reelection campaigns of members of
Congress, and the nudear industry as a whole. No one wants to be accountable
for any disasters that may stem from the construction of a permanent repository.
Though scientists claim the risks are small, opponents of Yucca Mountain suc-
cessfully prey on the fears of both the public and government officials. As a re-
sult, Yucca Mountain is still in its characterization phase. While many factors
20. Peter Kendall, A Mountain of Questions: Nuclear Waste: In Lethal Limbo, Chicago Tribune,
A13 (Sept 8, 1996).
21. James Flynn, et al, One Hundred Centuries of Solitude, 22 (Westview Press, 1995).
22. 42 USC § 10131(a)(4)-(5).
23. 42 Usc § 10222(a)(5).
24. 10 CFR § 961.11 (1996).
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contributed to this delay, the three most influential were legal challenges, scien-
tific uncertainty, and political gridlock.
A. LITIGATION
By consistently litigating various issues surrounding Yucca Mountain, Nevada
has substantially impeded the government's efforts to construct a permanent
repository. Expressing a typical "NIMBY (Not In My Backyard)" reaction to the
possibility of being forced to become a dumping ground for all of the nation's
nuclear waste, the state of Nevada has utilized the litigation process to challenge
the government at every stage.
Provisions in the NWPA initially sparked federalism concerns about the
states' lack of autonomy in decisions related to the nuclear waste repository.
Although many states resent the importation of wastes into their borders, there
is little they can do about it. The Supreme Court has consistently held that waste
is an item of interstate commerce and that, under the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the states may not ban or tax either its export or import.25
Attempts have been made to give states a limited right to regulate the interstate
flow of municipal solid waste, but so far none have been enacted into state law.
Since Congress' decision to target Yucca Mountain as the sole site under con-
sideration, Nevada has seized its at least six opportunities to challenge the gov-
ernment's decision-making process. Nevada can challenge (1) DOE's siting
guidelines; (2) DOE's Environmental Impact Statement; (3) DOE's decision to
recommend Yucca Mountain to the President; (4) NRC's technical requirements
and criteria for licensing; (5) NRC's decision to issue DOE a construction
authorization for a repository; and (6) EPA's independent radiation standard.
Although the government has not yet reached step three, Nevada has already
found ample opportunity for delaying the process, bombarding the Ninth Circuit
with challenges to various aspects of the NWPA plan.
Nevada first began its attack by raising federalism concerns in State of Nevada v
Watkins (I), where the Court rejected various challenges to the 1987 NWPA
amendments including state sovereignty and 10th Amendment arguments. 6 This
decision sparked controversy and has been the topic of academic review for its
10th Amendment implications.27
Nevada then objected to Yucca Mountain being designated as the sole site for
a permanent repository feasibility study. In State of Nevada v Watkins (11), the
Court dismissed Nevada's petition for review of DOE's site recommendation
guidelines for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.28 In State of Nevada v Watkins
(III), the Ninth Circuit later held that Nevada's challenge to the DOE's envi-
25. Chemical Waste Management, Inc v Hunt, 504 US 334, 344-46 (1992) (citing Philadephia v New
Jersy, 437 US 617 (1978)).
26. State ofNevada v Watkins (I), 914 F2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir 1990).
27. Sonny Swazo, Case Note: The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth Amendment: Nevada v Watkins, 36 Nat Resources J 127, 136-41 (1996).
28. State of Nevada v Watkins (I), 939 F2d 710, 716 (9th Cir 1991).
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ronmental assessment of Yucca Mountain was moot due to statutory amend-
ments.29 This trilogy of cases is only representative of the various suits brought
by Nevada.30
In 1989, Nevada also objected to the Bureau of Land Management's issuance
of right-of-way authorization to the DOE for characterization studies of the
land. However, in State of Nevada v Butford, the U.S. District Court dismissed Ne-
vada's complaint for failing to demonstrate actual injury, lack of ripeness, and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1
The latest battles have surrounded funding. In Loux v Herrington, the Court
found that Nevada was entitled to funding of studies it conducted at Yucca
Mountain prior to site characterization.32 But the courts did not extend this
funding for review of DOE's studies. After DOE declined to provide Nevada
with funds to review, monitor, and evaluate the DOE's site characterization, the
court in State of Nevada v U.S. Department of Energ held for the DOE in denying
Nevada's petition for review.33 By restricting the availability of resources for
review, Nevada took another blow to their litigation attacks.
Despite these legal losses, a 1995 challenge suggests that Nevada is not likely
to retreat from using litigation as a stalling tactic. In State of Nevada v 0 Leagy, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court opinion that denied Nevada the oppor-
tunity to perpetuate testimony of scientists regarding the proposed site of Yucca
Mountain.34 These depositions were to be used "to obtain the information for
use in future agency and judicial proceedings at which Nevada contemplates it
will challenge various anticipated decisions, approving the site, by the Depart-
ment of Energy...., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. '35 Not only has this litigation contributed to the delays, but
the mobilization of environmentally conscious organizations has fueled the
flames of this battle.
B. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
The second cause of delay at Yucca Mountain involves the complexity of de-
termining its scientific repercussions. Three sets of guidelines, developed by the
DOE, NRC, and the EPA respectively, govern the viability of Yucca Mountain.
The NWPA requires the Secretary of Energy to develop guidelines which "spec-
ify factors that qualify or disqualify any site from development as a repository,
including .. .hydrology, geophysics,. . .[and] proximity to water supplies. 36 In
29. State of Nevada v Watkins (I1), 943 F2d 1080, 1081 (9th Cir 1991).
30. Yet another is Couny of Esmeralda v US Department of Enegy, 925 F2d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir
1991) where the court vacated DOE's decision not to designate two Nevada counties as units of
local government affected by the project at Yucca Mountain.
31. State of Nevada v Burford, 708 F Supp 289, 291-92 (D Nev 1989).
32. Loux v Herrington, 777 F2d 529, 536 (9th Cir 1985).
33. State of Nevada v US Department of Energy, 133 F3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cit 1998).
34. State of Nevada v OLeagy, 63 F3d 932, 933 (9th Cit 1995).
35. Id.
36. 42 USC § 10132(a).
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accordance with this statutory requirement, the DOE issued the required set of
comprehensive guidelines in 1984 after a lengthy public rulemaking process. But
in 1996, the DOE issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking public
comments on a major revision to the siting guidelines that would replace the
specific guidelines with two very generalized ones: (1) that the repository shall
allow for containment of waste in accordance with the EPA standards and NRC
regulations after closure; and (2) that the repository shall perform in accordance
with EPA standards established specifically for Yucca Mountain and the NRC
regulations during construction, operation, and closure.37 Not only do these pro-
posals appear to contradict the requirements in the NWPA that factors be speci-
fied and imply that Yucca may not be feasible under the current guidelines, but
the EPA standards have yet to be developed.
If scientists cannot support their conclusions with a high degree of certainty,
the DOE will not be able to recommend Yucca Mountain to the President.
DOE's past reputation for site mismanagement is too tainted to risk an unin-
formed conclusion.38 The high stakes of such a determination have contributed
to the delay. There are many areas where scientists have been unable to support
a definitive prognosis on the feasibility of a Yucca repository. Scientists have to
deal with disagreements between previous assumptions and among others in the
scientific community, a lack of standards with which to compare their findings,
and an inability to predict with certainty so far into the future. After fifteen years,
they will only provide that "Yucca Mountain remains a promising site" and make
no further affirmation as to its viability as the repository location 9 The NWPA's
statement of purpose is to "[e]stablish a schedule... that will provide [a] reason-
able assurance that the public and [the] environment will be adequately protected
from the hazards posed" by radioactive waste in a repository.40 Without such
"reasonable assurance" (DOE's standard), there will be continued delay in the
construction of the repository.41
To better understand the scientists' dilemmas, it is important to realize that
the spent fuel will remain radioactive for 10,000 to 100,000 years.42 As time goes
by, the amount of radioactivity decreases. The rate of decrease is measured by
what are known as half-lives. After one half-life, half the original number of at-
oms remain, after two half-lives, only a quarter of the unstable atoms are left,
and so on. The range of half-lives is large, (with Uranium-238 needing as much
37. Nuclear Waste Project Office, Update on Nuclear Waste Program Developments, (April 1997)
<http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/upd4-97.htm>.
38. See Linda Ashton, Hanford Law Suit Averted, The Associated Press (Oct 15, 1998); John
Stang, Hanford Chromium Shows Up In Groundwater, Tri-City Herald (June 11, 1996); DOE, State of
Safety in the DOE Nuclear Complex (visited Feb 20, 1999) <http://
wVww.em.doe.gov/acd/finchp2.html>.
39. US DOE, Viability Assessment at 36 (cited in note 1).
40. 42 USC § 10131(b)(1).
41. US DOE, Viability Assessment at 36 (cited in note 1).
42. Dr. Jim Connell, The University of Chicago Compton Lectures. Lecture 2: Nuclear Stabiliy
and Radioactivity (delivered at the University of Chicago, Oct 5, 1996).
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as 4.5 billion years to cover one half-life period43), and it is this range, not the
quantity of decaying particles that is most crucial in determining the danger of
their radioactivity.44
The time required for the radioactive elements to become harmless differs
tremendously, depending on the particular isotope involved. Until then, radioac-
tive waste can be dangerous if it gets into the air, drinking water, or food. One
way this could happen would be if groundwater somehow entered the repository,
dissolved some of the waste, and carred it to the surface or the water table. If
radioactive elements make their way into Yucca Mountain's water table, which
moves laterally under the adjacent valley, there could be far-reaching health ef-
fects. Scientists, extrapolating thousands of years into the future, have targeted
the Amargosa Valley and the Franklin Lake Playa or Alkali Flat as the areas first
effected.45 There, wells are tapped for irrigation used for alfalfa, which in turn
feeds cows that deliver 30,000 gallons of milk to Los Angeles per day.46 Scientists
believe that water is the most likely vector by which radioactive material could be
released from the repository.47
Instead of providing clarification and a convergence of scientific opinion, re-
cent findings indicate that previous assumptions may no longer be substantiated
by the physical evidence. The first area of scientific uncertainty concerns the
chances that radioactive elements will reach the water supply. Engineers intend
to build the repository with man-made barriers including solid casks and drip-
shields to isolate the waste. But they are also counting on natural geologic barri-
ers to augment these in case some of the radioactive elements defy the human
barriers. For instance, Yucca Mountain was originally chosen in part for its dry,
barren climate. The minimal amount of rainfall to this region helps decrease the
amount of water that can flow through the repository and pick up contaminants
on the way down to the water table. However, the U.S. Geological Survey, which
had initially identified the site with positive endorsements, recently expressed
uncertainty about relying on the current modeling without a more extensive
analysis of the impact of climate change on Yucca's feasibility.48 And this is only
one area of scientific conflict. Two larger battles have been fought over the water
table and the rate of water migration within Yucca Mountain.
A second reason scientists and engineers chose Yucca Mountain was its deep
water table, which makes it possible to put a repository some 1000 feet under-
43. Willam A. Nierenberg, ed, 1 Engclopedia of Environmental Biology 656-59 (Academic Press,
1995).
44. Dr. Jim Connell, Lecture 2: Nuclear Stability and Radioactiity (cited in note 42).
45. Luther J. Carter & Thomas H. Pigford, Getting Yucca Mountain Rigbt, 54 The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (Mar/Apr 1998).
46. Steven Frishman, Nevada AgengyforNuclear Projects, Lecture at the Midwest Conference on
High-Level Radioactive Waste Transport (delivered at the University of Notre Dame, May
1997).
47. US DOE. Viability Assessment at 2 (cited in note 1); Geoff Doman, Federal Ofidak Sa
Yucca Mountain Can Be Safe, Nevada Appeal, Inside Yucca Mountain (visited on Apr 8, 1999)
<http://www.tahoe.com/appeal/stories.7.12.98/news/alnukel2Ju12383.html>.




ground and still have it be about 800 feet above the water table. But conflicts
arose among scientists surrounding the possibility that the water table could rise.
The first fears were apparent in a 1989 DOE report which concluded that
groundwater had risen well above the level of the proposed site several times in
the geologically recent past-anywhere from 10,000 to 100,000 years ago-and
is likely to rise again in the future.49 A panel of the National Research Council
disputed these claims. "Geologic evidence suggests that groundwater has never
risen to the level proposed for the repository; the largest rise may have been a
little over 100 feet in 10 million years." 50 Furthermore, "no mechanism known
to the panel appeared capable of raising the water table anywhere near the 900 to
1000 feet necessary to reach the proposed repository level." They further stated
that "the site of a proposed repository for high-level radioactive waste from the
nation's nuclear power plants is not at risk of groundwater infiltration." 5'
A third supposed advantage of Yucca Mountain is the slow travel time of wa-
ter through the unsaturated zone (the area above the water table). The Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management believes there is relatively little and slow
movement of water.5 2 Federal scientists debate with state scientists about the rate
of migration at Yucca Mountain. Nevada state scientists fear that groundwater
travel time from the repository to the water table is less than 1,000 years instead
of the many thousands of years that DOE believes5 3 This theory was recently
supported by discoveries of Chlorine-36 ("Cl-36"), 600 feet below ground. Left
over from nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, the high levels under-
ground at Yucca substantiate the theory that Yucca Mountain's rock pores are
extremely fractured.5 4 The fact that precipitation infiltrated the rock and carried
the CI-36 that deep in less than 50 years may legitimate concerns about the speed
at which radioactive elements can migrate through Yucca Mountain to the water
table.
DOE scientists counter, however, that even with fast groundwater movement,
such movement would quickly dilute any radioactivity in the water table 5 Fur-
thermore, if the facility is built at Yucca Mountain, engineers can use the telltale
49. Craig Hicks, Ground-Water Level Not Likely To Threaten Proposed Radioactive Waste Disposal
Site, National Research Council News, (Apr 13, 1992) (citing 1989 DOE Report).
50. Id (citing National Research Council, Ground Water at Yucca Mountain.- How High Can It
Rise? Panel on Coupled Hydrologic/Tectonic/lIydrothermal Systems at Yucca Mountain
(1992)).
51. Id.
52. Office of Civilian Waste Management Yucca Mountain Project, The Yucca Mountain Site
Characterization Studies (visited on Mar 11, 1999) <http://www.ymp.gov/refshlf/yms
/ymss2.htm>.
53. Petition For Disqualification of Yucca Mountain From Consideration As A Nuclear Waste Reposi-
tog, <http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/radwaste/petition.htm> (visited on Apr 18, 1999); State
of Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office, Scientific and Technical Concerns at 14.
54. Mike Richard, Nuclear Energy Institute, Science Working To Ensure A Safe Place For Used
Nuclear Fuel 4 (e-mail sent to Senator Simon's office) (June 18, 1996).
55. Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, State of Nevada and Related Findings Indicating That The
Proposed Yucca Mountain Site is Not Suitable for Development as a Reposito0 '. Changing Rules and Strate-
gies for the Yucca Mountain Site (Nov 1998) <http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/yucca
/nuctime2.htm>.
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CI-36 marker to avoid faults in the rock, thus using natural drainage features to
channel water away from the repository.5 6
An additional cause of delay is the conflict between Congressional require-
ments and the scientists' capabilities. The uncertainty of Yucca Mountain's geo-
logic characteristics combine with unrealistic timelines and standards to contrib-
ute to the delay of the permanent repository. The incredible lifespans of the ra-
dioactive elements make it impossible to ensure that the repository will contain
them until they are safe. Yet the NWPA actually requires scientists to guarantee
that the storage casks will retain the wastes for 100 years, an equally difficult
task.57 Such unrealistic expectations have contributed to the repository's fifteen-
year delay.
Inaction is only compounded by a lack of coordination among agencies. For
instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for
setting the basic standards needed to obtain a license, including the allotted
amount of radioactivity that can be released. DOE estimates that "the repository
will release 8,000 curies over 10,000 years, which is just a fraction of the 7.5 mil-
lion curies naturally occurring on land." s5 8 But there is considerable debate about
the proposed 100-millirem release standard for radioactivity. This is only one-
third of the 360 millirems that the average American receives per year from natu-
ral sources. The 100 millirems would be equivalent to getting two and a half fill
sets of dental x-rays in a year.5 9 The Health Physics Society has stated that below
10,000 millirems, '"health effects are either too small to be observed or are non-
existent"60
Another comparison can be made with a substance like radon, found in
homes, which accounts for about 200 millirem/year.61 Bernard Cohen notes that
radon "gives the average American a thousand times as much radiation as he or
she can expect to get from nuclear power, including projected accidents, radioac-
tive wastes, and everything else."62 Yet there is very little concern expressed
about its risks, suggesting the existence of a motivational distortion. Perhaps this
is yet another example of the public's attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance.
Thinking that they are not, in their daily lives, exposing themselves to the risk of
radon, causes them to see its risks as lower than they really are.63
Not only is there disagreement as to the proper amount of radiation release,
but the government is changing the rules as the game is played instead of ac-
knowledging Yucca's limitations. By 1992, it was clear that the Yucca Mountain
56. Mike Richard, Science Working To Ensure A Safe Place at 4. (cited in note 54).
57. Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporagy Storage Options, CRS Report for Congress
(Cong Research Serv, Apr 22, 1996).
58. Letter from Senator J. Bennet Johnston, Ranking Democrat, to Carol Browner, Adminis-
trator of the EPA, May 23, 1996 at 2.
59. Fredreka Schouten, Rough Roadjor Nuclear waste, Gannett News Service (Apr 15, 1997).
60. Health Physics Society, Radiation Risk in Perspective (Jan 1996).
61. Letter fromJ. BennetJohnston to Carol Browner at 2 (cited in note 58).
62. Bernard L. Cohen, Turning The Tide Of Pubic Opinion On Nuclear Power, Nuclear News 27
(Apr 1997).
63. See, generally, George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am Econ Rev 307, 307-08 (1982).
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site could not meet limits the EPA had set for the release of carbon-14.64 Instead
of disqualifying the site, DOE launched an effort to convince EPA that its stan-
dard should be relaxed. While the releases would violate the standard, they rea-
soned, the resultant individual dose would be negligible. When EPA declined to
modify the standard, Congress interceded in 1992 with the Energy Policy Act,
directing EPA to write a new standard specifically for the Yucca Mountain site.65
This standard was to be one that limited doses to individuals instead of the long-
term population risk. The EPA is to retain the National Academy of Sciences to
formulate a recommendation for a new standard that "shall prescribe the maxi-
mum annual effective dose equivalent for individual members of the public from
releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materials stored or dis-
posed of in the repository. '66 Congress further directed the NRC to revise its
repository licensing rule, as necessary, to be consistent with the new EPA stan-
dard. 67 Ironically, though no new standard for a Yucca Mountain repository has
been promulgated to date, the scientists are still expected to make predictions
about the viability of the site.
These sorts of scientific disagreements, unrealistic timelines, and lack of coor-
dination among agencies have been major contributors to the delay at Yucca
Mountain. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said that predictions would be stated
in probabilities. "That's all one can offer," he said. "I don't think in science one
can offer certainty. ' 68 Perhaps not certainty, but when the stakes are this high,
society should be concerned about the margin of error.
C. POLITICAL GRIDLOCK
If the scientists have yet to reach a consensus with regards to reasonable as-
surance, it is unrealistic to expect the public to feel secure. External influences,
like the media, provide the underlying basis of people's risk perception. Even
though people are exposed to high risks every day due to common activities,
surveys show that they are more worried about the catastrophic incidents that
have less chance of occurring. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein's survey on
members of the League of Women Voters (LOWV) and college students
showed that "nuclear power had the lowest fatality estimate and the highest per-
ceived risk for both LOWV members and [college] students."69
64. Eureka County Nuclear Waste Page, (visited on Mar 22, 1999) <http://www.
yuccamountain.org/new.htm>.
65. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-486, 106 Stat 2776 (1992), codified at 42 USC
513201.
66. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System, Total System Performance Assessment-
Viabiif Assessment (TSPA-VA) Methods and Assumptions, 1-3 (Nov 7, 1997).
67. Id.
68. Matthew L. Wald, Contradictions Seen in Report on Possible Nuclear-Waste Site, NY Times
(Dec 16, 1998).
69. Paul Slovic, et al, Rating the Risks in Theodore S. Glickman and Michael Gough, eds,
Readings in Risk 69 (Resources for the Future, 1990).
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Research on behavioral decision-making also suggests that people make judg-
ments about probability on the basis of heuristic devices.70 People tend to think
that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or "avail-
able," biasing people's assessments of nuclear risk in light of dominant images
like Chernobyl.71 Even if the risks of devastation surrounding Yucca Mountain
are small (the chance of a new volcanic center forming and disrupting a potential
repository at Yucca Mountain in the next 10,000 years is about one chance in 70
million per year),7 2 the severity of the risk (a volcano erupting and spreading
radioactive waste into the air) takes precedent in most people's risk calculations.
Such systematic errors may lead to a lack of trust in politicians who support
Yucca Mountain without any hesitancy, and in turn affect the ways that Con-
gressmen vote. Tom between their constituents and the nuclear lobbyists, the
efforts to provide an interim solution to the nuclear waste problem has only
resulted in more gridlock.
In response to DOE's apparent inability to dispose of the waste by 1998 via a
permanent repository, Congress realized that there must be an interim solution
to deal with the waste until the feasibility of Yucca Mountain could be deter-
mined. The solution most actively pursued has been proposals for an interim site
at Yucca Mountain. In fact, replacements of the NWPA that mandate construc-
tion of an interim site at Yucca Mountain have been proposed five times by both
the Senate and the House.7 3
In December of 1995, momentum was building for passage of major revisions
to the NWPA, H.R. 1020 and S. 1271, both of which mandated interim con-
struction by January 31. 74 The action came at a time when the DOE program to
characterize a repository site at Yucca was experiencing large budget cuts as pro-
ponents and opponents alike pointed to the high costs and limited progress of
the repository program.75 Both bills would further reduce funding for the reposi-
tory site by shifting priority toward building an interim storage site for spent
nuclear fuel adjacent to Yucca and toward preparing the infrastructure necessary
to allow shipments to begin in 1998. With a 60,000 ton capacity and 100 year
renewable license, it would be easy for such a site to become a de facto perma-
nent solution. These nuclear waste bills eventually were forced to take a back
seat to budget wranglings, government shutdowns, and Nevada's filibuster at-
tempts.
70. See David C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decsion Making in LegalScholar-
sh:A Literature Review, 51 Vand L Rev 1499, 1501 (Nov 1998).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 Geo LJ 2637, 2650 (uly 1998).
72. US DOE, Yucca Mountain Project, Yucca Mountain Volcanic Hazard Analysis Completed,
YMP-96-15 (Sept 24, 1996).
73. HR 1020, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995); S 1271, 104th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 25,
1995); S 1936, 104th Cong, 2d Sess (ul 10, 1995); HR 1270, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 10,
1997); S 104, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 21, 1997).
74. Mark Holt and Zachary Davis, Nuclear Energy Polig-, CRS Issue Brief 1B88090 CRS-1




But on July 31, 1997, the Senate passed S. 1936, a bill identical to the defeated
S. 1271, to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 by a vote of 63-37Y6
The week before, a filibuster by the Nevadan senators was defeated by a 65-34
vote. Both of these tallies fell short of the 67 votes needed to override a prom-
ised presidential veto. House leaders had earlier indicated that it would not take
up its version of the bill, H.R. 1020, unless the Senate version passed with a
veto-proof majority. When that did not occur, the bill was effectively dead and
was not considered further in the 104th Congress.
But supporters of S. 1936 would not be silenced so easily. On April 7, 1997,
the 105th Congress again reintroduced S. 1936 as S. 104. Although nearly identi-
cal to the previous bills, Senator Murkowski (R-AL), a primary supporter of the
bill, did try to appease some of the opponents. He added provisions that had the
transportation routes avoid populated areas, gave the EPA back its authority on
radiation releases, and had DOE draft an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the interim site. He even extended the time that the President could
halt construction of the interim site until March of 1999 and delayed the opening
until 2003. If the Yucca site were not deemed suitable, however, the President
would only have 18 months to select an alternative site. This led to an onslaught
of amendments by the congressmen from the states listed as alternatives, "bar-
ring the President from even considering locations in Washington state, South
Carolina and Tennessee that are among the most likely alternatives." 77 Although
advocates of the bill won in the House on a 307-120 vote, the Senate again fell
two shy of a veto-proof margin in the Senate.78 But their persistence had nar-
rowed the gap by two votes.
The 106th Congress will try yet again. On January 6, 1999, Representatives
Fred Upton (R-MI) and Edolphus Towns (D-NY) introduced H.R. 45 to amend
the NWPA. Its companion bill in the Senate, S. 608, soon followed 9 It is uncer-
tain if recent changes in Congressional dynamics or the DOE's recent issuance
of a Viability Assessment will affect the viability of another approach at mandat-
ing interim storage. Although not definitive in support of Yucca, it may provide
enough scientific assurance to overcome the Administration's veto of interim
storage.
In addition to these Yucca specific details, another factor that may substan-
tially influence the Yucca Mountain plan is the Waste Isolation Pilot Project
(WIPP), the first underground permanent repository for transuranic wastes. On
March 26, 1999, the federal government sent its first shipment from Los Alamos
76. David Applegate, Update on High-Level Nuclear Waste Legislation, American Geological
Institute, Government Affairs Program (Dec 26, 1996) <http://www.agiweb.org/
agi/legisl04/yuccaupd.html>.
77. Jonathan Weisman, Waste Site Bill Passes Senate, Remains Vulnerable to Veto, 55, 16 Cong
Quarterly Weekly Rep 902-903 (Apr 19, 1997).
78. Congress Daily, Waste Bill X pporters See Momentum; Nevadans Defiant, (Jan 13, 1999).
79. Mark Holt and Zachary Davis, Nuclear Energy Poliy, CRS Issue Brief at CRS-88090 (Cong
Research Serv April 21, 1999) (cited in note 10).
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National Laboratory to the site near Carlsbad, New Mexico.§° WIPP is different
from Yucca in areas such as classification of wastes (transuranic wastes encom-
pass a mixture of items like plutonium-contaminated rolls and dothing)8 1, geol-
ogy of the repository (WIPP is placed in salt beds), and jurisdiction of the site
(the state has jurisdiction over mixed wastes while the federal government retains
it over high level wastes)82 . Yet the similarities of public opposition, legal battles,
scientific uncertainty, and a 25-year delay are enough to closely track the future
developments at WIPP as influencing the future of Yucca.
III. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. IND!ANA -M!CH!GAN
In 1993, various utilities and state agencies' concern over DOE's ability to
meet the 1998 deadline prompted them to ask the Department how it would go
about performing its responsibilities. The Department, apparently anticipating its
inability to take the waste by the deadline, took the position in its 1995 Final
Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues, that it "does not have an
unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept high level waste and
spent nuclear fuel beginning January 31, 1998 in the absence of a repository or
interim storage facility constructed under the [NWPA]."83 DOE's argument re-
lied on responses to the public comment period, provisions of the NWPA, its
legislative history, and the Standard Contract. 4 The statutory focal point of this
argument is Section 302. In it, the NWPA states:
(5) Contracts entered into under this section shall provide that-
(A) following commencement of operation of a repository, the Secretary shall
take title to the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as
expeditiously as practicable upon the request of the generator or owner of such
waste or spent fuel; and
(B) in return for the payment of fees established by this section, the Secretary,
beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level radioac-
tive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as provided in this subchapter0 5
In support of the position that they were not obligated to dispose of waste ab-
sent the operation of a repository, the DOE claims that Section 302(a)(5)(A) and
302(a)(5)(B) must be read not only together, but also in the context of the entire
80. Ed Halloran, First Underground Nuclear Waste Plant Draws Mixed Reiiews, Agence France-
Presse (Apr 3, 1999).
81. Carla Crowder, Activists T7 to Halt Nuke Waste, Denver Rocky Mountain News (Mar 25,
1999).
82. State of New Mexico v Richardson. 39 F Supp 2d 48 (D DC 1999).
83. 60 Fed Reg 21793-94.
84. Id.
85. 42 USC § 10222(a).
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Act.86 As such, the condition of a repository attached to the take title provision
of (A) was meant to extend to the disposal provision of (B). DOE also argues
that other clauses of the NWPA suggest that they are not obligated to dispose of
the waste until the commencement of a repository. First, "Section 302(a)(1) of
the Act, which authorizes the Secretary to enter in contracts with utilities 'for the
acceptance of tide, subsequent transportation, and disposal of...(SNF)' indicates
that the duty to accept title and the mandate to dispose are part of a sequential
process: The Act contemplates that 'taking title' is a predicate to 'disposal'. 81 7
Second, each statutory condition of the NWPA for operation of a repository
(including the viability of Yucca Mountain, recommendation to the President,
and the licensing by the NRC) "represents a Congressionally-created contingency
that could prevent or delay construction and operation of a repository."88 Given
these contingencies, the DOE argues that Congress could not have intended an
unconditional obligation on the DOE.
To further support its argument for a conditional obligation, the DOE then
cites to legislative history. In describing his reasons for substituting the previous
date of December 31, 1996 of Section 302(a)(5) to the present date of January
31, 1998, the primary sponsor, Senator James McClure stated:
Under the substitute amendment, there was some concern that, in directing the
Secretary to take title to and dispose of such wastes no later than December 31,
1996, we might not be giving the Secretary enough flexibility to tailor his
schedule for accepting such wastes to the availability of a repository. This
amendment simply directs the Secretary to take title to such wastes as expedi-
tiously as practicable, upon the request of the generator of those wastes, after
the commencement of repository operation8 [emphasis added].
In addition to denying an unconditional statutory obligation, the DOE also
denies an unconditional contractual obligation to dispose of the waste. The cru-
cial clause of the Contract states that "acceptance of title by DOE...and disposal
of such SNF...establishes the fees to be paid...The services to be provided by
DOE under this contract shall begin, after commencement of facility operations,
not later than January 31, 1998." 90 The contract defines a DOE facility as a
facility for the purpose of disposing...or such other facility(ies) to which spent
nuclear fuel...may be shipped by DOE prior to its transportation to a disposal
facility," meaning that either the permanent Yucca Mountain repository or an
interim repository triggers the DOE's service obligations.9 1 Without either of
these facilities, the DOE argues that their disposal obligation does not com-
mence.
Using these arguments, the DOE supported its statement that it did not have
an unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept high level waste or
86. 60 Fed Reg at 21795.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 21796 (citing 128 Cong Rec S 15657) (Dec 20, 1982).
90. 10 CFR§ 961.11.
91. Id.
[6:251
Byond Yucca Mounaiin 267
spent fuel beginning January 31, 1998 in the absence of a repositoryY2 Disquali-
fying the only two relevant statutory provisions, the Department also took the
position that "it lacks statutory authority under the Act to provide interim stor-
age." 93 Even if it did have an unconditional obligation under the statute, they
claim that the Delays Clause of the Standard Contract would provide an adminis-
trative remedy for their failure to satisfy an obligation under the statuteY4
But the utilities were just as determined as the DOE to absolve themselves
from the headaches of the nuclear waste. In Indiana Michigan, utilities and state
commissions who had paid fees pursuant to the NWPA sought review of DOE's
order rejecting an unconditional disposal obligation. 5
Alternatively, petitioners contended that the NWPA and the Standard Con-
tract do impose an unconditional obligation on the DOE to begin disposing of
the spent fuel by January 31, 1998 regardless of the absence of a facilityP6 In
determining whether the legal obligation of DOE to accept SNF by January 31,
1998 was conditioned on the presence of an operational repository or interim
storage facility, the Court held for the utilities in finding that DOE's obligation
to dispose of the waste was not conditioned on the existence of a repository or
other facility.9 7 Although this holding imposes a disposal liability on DOE that
they had previously denied, it does not impose a concurrent liability to take title,
leaving that responsibility with the utilities. Furthermore, the court declined to
rule on the applicable remedy before the DOE actually breached their duty, pro-
viding little ammunition for the utilities in their struggle for an interim storage
facility off-site.
In reviewing this agency interpretation, the D.C. Circuit followed the two-step
statutory analysis established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Defense
Coundl, Inc. which asks (1) whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue, and (2) if not, whether the agency's answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute." 98 The Court found that Congress had spo-
ken unambiguously through expressed intent as to this issue, and that the DOE
had violated this intent in its Final Order.
The Court bases its decision on a rejection of the DOE's theory of interde-
pendence between the subsections (A) and (B) of NWPA's section 302(a)(5).
Instead, they interpreted each of the subsections as imposing two distinct liabili-
ties in response to two separate triggers:
DOE's duty under subsection (A) to take title to the SNF is linked to the
commencement of repository operations and is triggered when a generator or
owner of SNF makes a request to DOE. DOE's duty under subsection (B) to
92- 60 Fed Reg 21794.
93. 60 Fed Reg at 21794, 21797.
94. Id at 21797.
95. Indiana Michigan, 88 F3d at 1273 (cited in note 6).
96. Id at 1275.
97. Id at 1276-77.




dispose of the SNF is conditioned on the payment of fees by the owner and is
triggered, at the latest, by the arrival ofJanuary 31, 1998 9
Therefore, although the utilities have taken steps to trigger both of the obliga-
tions (requested the DOE to take tile and paid fees), their commencement is
conditioned on different events. Whereas the court interpreted the disposal obli-
gation as conditioned upon only the January 31, 1998 date, they view the tite
obligation as being conditioned on the commencement of a repository. There-
fore, the DOE is only liable for not disposing of the waste.
Viewed in isolation, the court's statutory interpretation is valid. If Congress
had intended for the repository condition to extend to both the take tile and
disposal liability, they would have placed the conditional clause in an all-inclusive
position before it delineated the two obligations into different subsections in-
stead of only within section 302(a)(5). The court's semantic argument is also
convincing. DOE argued that the meaning of "to dispose of' (not defined in the
NWPA) in section 302(a)(5)(B) is simply a grammatical form of "disposal" (de-
fined in the NWPA as "the emplacement in a repository of...spent nuclear
fuel...with no foreseeable intent of recovery"). 1 ° Therefore, Congress intended
section 302(a)(5)(B), which speaks to the obligation to dispose, to be conditioned
on a repository. The Court rejected this interpretation based on the belief that
when an agency does not specify the definition, the common term definition of
"dispose of' is to be used, which does not condition a repository.01 Addition-
ally, the Court held that the DOE had previously acknowledged a distinction in
the two terms themselves, and that the Standard Contract also uses the com-
mencement of "facility operations" instead of only a permanent repository as the
precondition for disposal. Given the court's determination above, even an inter-
pretation of "disposal" instead of "dispose of' would not be enough to absolve
DOE of the liability in light of the January 31, 1999 trigger. 0 2
When viewed in context of the whole statute, however, there is some indica-
tion that the purpose of the statute points toward a reading of the two subsec-
tions together. DOE produced evidence of the sequential nature of the subsec-
tions. They cited "section 302(a)(1), which describes the Standard Contract as
'for the acceptance of tile, subsequent transportation, and disposal of such waste
or spent fiel."'' 03 To further complicate matters, the Standard Contract notes
that "DOE shall have the right to dispose as it sees fit of any SNF and /or HLW
to which it has taken tile," implying a sequential order.104 Additionally, the
NWPA states that "[i] f the Secretary takes title to any such [radioactive] material,
the Secretary shall enter into the appropriate financial arrangements described in
subsection (A) or (B) of section 10222 of this tile for the disposal of such mate-
99. Id at 1276 (cited in note 6).
100. Id at 1275 (citing 42 USC § 10101(9)).
101. Id at 1275 (citing McNal4, v United States, 483 US 350, 358-359 (1987)).
102. Id at 1275.
103. Id at 1276.
104. 10 CFR § 961.11.
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rial." 105 This if/then clause suggests that if the Secretary does not take title to the
waste, then it should not enter into contracts for disposal.
The court's contractual justification for the independent provision is also
weak. It determined that the separation of the take title obligation from the dis-
posal obligation in the Standard Contract supports an interpretation of inde-
pendence. In fact, the Standard Contract does speak to the take title obligation
and the disposal obligation in the same article. Article II provides that "accep-
tance of title by DOE...and disposal of such SNF...establishes the fees to be
paid...The services to be provided by DOE under this contract shall begin, after
commencement of facility operations, not later than January 31, 1998"106 (em-
phasis added). If the "services" here refers to taking title and disposing of the
waste as listed above, the Contract does in fact place the requirements in the
same place in the Standard Contract. Granted, the Contract later addresses more
specifics about the meanings and obligations of DOE's take title requirements.
But there is no mention there of the trigger for the obligation to take title. Those
conditions are only set forth in Article II, referring to both the take title provi-
sion and the disposal provision. Therefore, perhaps both title and disposal were
intended to be conditioned on a repository.
In making this distinction between the take title and disposal obligations, the
court's holding in Indiana Michigan results in split liability between the utilities and
the DOE. In holding DOE liable for the disposal, the court is simultaneously
absolving the DOE from liability for not taking title to the waste. The DOE
argues that it is inconsistent to believe that Congress would intend for one party
to have ownership of the SNF while another party would have physical control
over it.107 But the court points to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an ex-
ample of an agency that "recognizes a distinction between ownership of nuclear
materials and the right to possess or use the materials."1 08 Until a facility is op-
erational, the title for the waste is therefore left with the utilities. But the mere
passing ofJanuary 31, 1998 triggered DOE's obligation to dispose of the waste.
In summary, the Court took special care in Indiana-Michigan to emphasize the
reciprocal nature of the obligations: DOEs duty to dispose of the SNF in a
timely manner is "in return for" the payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste
Fund.109 The court held that DOE's obligation to meet the 1998 deadline is
"without qualification or condition," and identified DOE's duty to "perform its
part of the contractual bargain."110 But the court left the specific remedy unre-
solved, noting it was premature to determine the appropriate remedy since DOE
had not yet defaulted on its obligation. The court therefore remanded the matter
to DOE for "further proceedings consistent with" their opinion 1 " DOE neither
105. 42 USC § 10194(d).
106. 10 CFR 961.11.
107. Indiana Michigan, 88 F3d at 1276 (cited in note 6).
108. Id.
109. Id (citing 42 USC § 10222(a)(5)(B)).
110. Id at 1276, 1273.
111. Id at 1277.
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sought rehearing of that decision nor petitioned the Supreme Court for further
review.
B. NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY I AND II
After the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Indiana Michigan, the DOE still in-
formed the utilities and the states that it would be unable to comply with the
statutory deadline that the court had just reaffirmed. In late 1996, the utilities and
the states initiated discussions with DOE and asked about the procedure and
schedule that the Department would follow to comply with the court's decision.
DOE responded to the utilities by announcing that it "will be unable to begin
acceptance of spent nuclear fuel for disposal in a repository or interim storage
facility by January 31, 1998."112 The Department recognized that the delay would
affect "large number[s]" of contract holders, but nonetheless expressed "uncer-
tainty as to when DOE will be able to begin spent fuel acceptance."' 13 The letter
ended by cordially inviting "the views of all contract holders on how the delay
can best be accommodated.""n 4 In a similar letter to the states, DOE wrote that
it "understands that states are concerned about the Department's delay," that the
delay may result in "hardship" to contract holders, and expressed its willingness
"to consider amendments to individual contracts that would mitigate the impacts
of the delay particular contract holders will experience in the acceptance of their
spent fuel," admitting that the Yucca Mountain facility will not be operational
until the year 2010.115
One year to the day before DOE's obligation was to begin, the utilities and
state agencies responded to DOE's defiance. In Northern States Power Company v
United States Department of Energy ("Northern I") the utilities and state agencies
separately petitioned for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel DOE to com-
ply with Indiana Michigan and begin disposal of the nuclear materials by January
31, 1998.116 Petitioners also requested that their payments to the Nuclear Waste
Fund be placed in escrow unless and until DOE meets its obligations to dispose
of SNF, and asked that the Court prohibit DOE from taking any punitive action
toward those who suspend payments to the Fund."7
Four months after this was filed, DOE responded to comments submitted by
contract holders regarding the anticipated delay. The Department began by rec-
ognizing that "Section 302 [of the NWPA] specifies that the contracts shall pro-
vide for the Department to begin to dispose of spent fuel not later than January
31, 1998." 118 DOE then expressed its belief that "the Standard Contract adopted
by the Department pursuant to Section 302 and entered into by the contract




115. Id at 757-58.
116. Id at 754.
117. Id at 757.
118. Id at 754, 756.
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holders specifies the available remedies in the event the Department is unable to
meet the January 31, 1998 date."119 Under Article IX of the contract, the De-
partment asserted, the Department was "not obligated to provide a financial
remedy for the delay," because the delay, in the Department's estimation, was an
"avoidable delay." 120
In Northern I, the court first denied the utilities' request for a writ of manda-
mus forcing DOE to start disposal121 Even though the utilities have a dear right
to relief, "the-Standard Contract between DOE and the utilities provides a po-
tentially adequate remedy," precluding mandamus.2 The Contract provides that
"[i]f a party's delay is avoidable, the charges and schedules in the contract must
be equitably adjusted to reflect additional costs incurred by the other party."12 3
Although specifically speaking to avoidable delays, the court found that it was
enough for the contract to "provide a scheme for dealing with delayed perform-
ance." 124
This decision was wise for many reasons. First, the court is not in a position to
rush the science needed to determine the feasibility of storing nuclear waste.
Since Yucca Mountain is far from operational, the DOE would have to con-
struct an interim repository to meet this suggested mandamus. Not only would
this cause competition for funding and other resources, that in turn could slow
repository development to the point of an indefinite "interim" facility, but there
is also little incentive to finish the permanent repository within a reasonable
timeframe, if at all. The operation of the interim repository will trigger the trans-
fer of title to the government, providing the nuclear industry with little short-
term interest in the completion of Yucca Mountain.
Although "centralized" storage at an interim site near Yucca is touted as pref-
erable to the current scattering of SNF, "centralized" is a long-term concept. In
the short-term, moving the waste from the 72 facilities really only involves an
increase to 73 facilities that have SNF-not a decrease to one. The true central-
ized storage would only occur about 20 years after the last nuclear plants are
decommissioned (the time it takes for the waste to cool before shipments can
occur). The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board also notes that a premature
storage siting decision is likely to cause a real or perceived prejudicing of the
repository's site-suitability evaluation.12 5
The Court goes on, however, to issue a writ of mandamus precluding DOE
from advancing any construction of the Standard Contract that would excuse its
delinquency on the ground that it has not yet established a repository or interim
storage126 In doing so, this Court rejected the DOE's recycling of "the argu-
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id at 759.
122. Id at 754.
123. 10 CFR § 961.11.
124. Northern I, 128 F3d at 759 (cited in note 112).
125. Nudear Waste Technical Review Board, Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy,
Diposal and Storage of Spent Nclear Fuel-Finding the Right Balance, 28 (March 1996).
126. Northern I, 128 F3d at 761. (cited in note 112).
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ments rejected by this court in Indiana Michigan" and thus their avoidable delay
defense. 27 This defense was based on the Standard Contract, defining an avoid-
able delay as one caused by "circumstances within the reasonable control" of the
delinquent party. 128 Agreeably, such a defense would unjustly allow the DOE to
excuse itself from the costs of a delay caused by their own actions, allowing "the
Executive Brach to void an unequivocal obligation imposed by Congress.'
29
Then in Northern States Power Company v United States Department of Enery
("Northern II'), other utilities advanced identical suits against the DOE with the
addition of a request for a bar on DOE from using the Nuclear Waste Fund for
damages. 30 The Court "express[ed] no opinion on the legality of the DOE's
using utility or ratepayer-supplied monies to pay costs or damages." 13 It also
reaffirmed that the statute does not require performance, and denied the utilities'
request to order DOE to dispose of the fuel.132 The Supreme Court has denied
DOE review of this decision, leaving the DOE and utilities to negotiate damages
amongst themselves. 33
IV. IMPACTS OF SPLIT LIABILITY ON THE INTERIM STRATEGIES FOR
HANDLING THE NUCLEAR WASTE
By rejecting both DOE's statutory construction and its avoidability defense,
the D.C. Circuit has made it clear that DOE cannot escape their responsibility
for meeting the 1998 deadline by relying on the inoperation of a permanent re-
pository. But by affirming the unconditional obligation to dispose of the waste,
the court in Indiana Michigan seems to affirm the conditional obligation of taking
title. This split decision has shifted the expectations of both the DOE and the
utilities, creating dual incentives to both (1) reevaluate their respective liabilities
and responsibilities and (2) cooperate towards limiting these liabilities. Whereas
there was previously only focus on the long-term goal of definitively approving
Yucca Mountain, both parties may now start to realize that they need to look
beyond Yucca Mountain in order to implement some near-term strategies for
dealing with the waste. Instead of viewing interim action as a necessary loss for
the actuality of Yucca Mountain, it can be viewed as a necessary step towards
limiting their liability.
This split liability has shifted the expectations of the parties. As evidenced by
their formal interpretation and requests for comments, it is clear the DOE
hoped to avoid all liability for the SNF after 1998 due to the absence of a reposi-
tory. By enforcing an unconditional obligation on DOE to dispose of the waste,
the D.C. Circuit has prompted them to take action to limit their liability by fo-
127. Id at 760.
128. 10 CFR 5961.11.
129. Northern I, 128 F3d at 760 (cited in note 112).
130. Northern States Power Co. v US Department of Energy, 1998 WL 276581, *1 (DC Cir 1998).
131. Id at *1.
132. Id at *2.
133. US Department of Energy v Northern States Power Compay, 119 S Ct 540 (1998).
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cusing on a short-term solution. Similarly, the utilities were hoping that all of
their wastes would be taken off their hands in title and in possession by January
31, 1998. By realizing that they still retain title until a repository or interim site is
available, the Court has reaffirmed their obligation to ensure safekeeping of the
waste. This shift has forced both the utilities and the DOE to reevaluate their
respective liabilities and responsibilities.
A. DOE's LiABimLES
The Indiana Michigan court's textual distinction between the take title and dis-
posal requirements may create practical problems of interpretation, and surely
leaves some open questions concerning DOE's liability. Attempts to reconcile
the statutory intent with the court's interpretation of the relevant provision may
provide some confusion concerning DOE's obligation to dispose of the waste.
Both the NWPA and the Standard Contract define disposal as "the emplacement
in a repository of high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or other highly
radioactive waste with no foreseeable intent of recovery."'134 But if one follows
the court's interpretation of "dispose of' in the relevant clause, this implies the
DOE's obligation may only be "to get rid of; throw away; discard" instead of
emplace in a repository. 35 Clearly, emplacement in a permanent repository
would absolve DOE of its liability, but does this "common understanding" defi-
nition of "dispose of' lessen the standard needed to meet this obligation? For
instance, using the court's interpretation, DOE might have the option of merely
moving the waste to another utility's site. This is contrary to the statutory defini-
tion of "disposal," where the DOE is limited to emplacement in a permanent
repository.
Another area of uncertainty is DOE's financial liability. The nuclear industry
had argued that "the DOE would be liable for some $50 billion or more in dam-
ages, including full reimbursement of the Nuclear Waste Fund with interest,
damages, and so forth."'136 By the end of 1998, 11 utility companies had filed
lawsuits in the Court of Federal Claims seeking damages ranging from $70 mil-
lion to $1.5 billion. 37 The rulings initially exposed DOE to extensive damages.
Since October 30, 1999, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ruled in three
separate cases that DOE is financially responsible for its failure to remove used
nuclear fuel by January 1998. In Yankee Atomic Electric Company v United States,138
('Yankee") the utility brought suit against the DOE for breach of contract for
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In response to
DOE's motion to dismiss, the Court held that the utility's claim was not con-
verted from a breach of contract into a claim "arising under" the contract subject
134. Id; 10 CFR § 961.11
135. Indiana Michigan, 88 F3d at 1275 (cited in note 6).
136. Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Federal Court Won't Force Interim Storage; Trans-
port Says DOE Must Pay for On-Site Storage; Decision Undercuts HR 1270 Backers,
<http://www.nirs.org/monoine/FDERALCOURTWON.html>, (visited Jan 30, 1999).
137. Court Throws Out Nuclear Waste Case, Associated Press (Nov 30, 1998).
138. Yankee Atomic Electric Company v United States, 42 Fed C1 223 (1998).
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to administrative procedures. They based this decision on an analysis of the
completeness of relief available under the specific provision of the contract. If a
party is able to get the same relief on a claim arising under the contract as a
breach of contract, it is converted to a claim arising under. The utilities did win
summary judgment, however, on the contract liability for DOE. Two similar
suits have been filed in the Federal Court of Claims, Connecticut Yankee Atomic
Power Company v United States, 139 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company v United
States, 140 both of which bring taxpayers one step closer to footing a bill of as
much as $56 billion to cover DOE's default.1 4'
But the most recent Federal Claims case takes the opposite position. Granting
the DOE's motion to dismiss, the court in Northern States Power Company v United
States held that the utility must first use the DOE's administrative process for
equitable adjustment in fees before seeking damages in Claims Court. 42 The
court rejected the utility's arguments that (1) the contract only applied to delays
that arise after performance has begun; (2) the magnitude of the delay warrants a
cardinal change or a constructive suspension; and (3) that the DOE's ability to
increase fees in response to any damages would result in the utilities funding
their own equitable adjustment, surely a situation that does not qualify as the
"complete relief'needed to mandate the use of administrative procedures. 43 The
court's interpretation of which claims "arise under"the contract and thus man-
date administrative procedures differs from both Northern Power's argument and
the court's interpretation in Yankee. Where the latter relies on a completeness
theory, the court here states that:
the only consideration that counts is whether the parties' contract contains lan-
guage that addresses the specific contingency to which the claim relates and
specifies the adjustment that is to be provided in the event liability is estab-
lished. Where these twin considerations exist, the claim "arises under" the con-
tract.144
Utilities that may have been anxious to file similar claims against the DOE after
their fellow utilities' successes may be having second thoughts after this latest
defeat.
Even if DOE is able to postpone its damages, exactly how they plan to pay
remains another open issue. Although the court in Northern States II has not
barred DOE from using the Nuclear Waste Fund, the DOE itself seems to be
hesitant. It reads the NWPA to earmark that money for waste related operations,
not damages. The Act specifies that the Secretary may make expenditures from
the Waste Fund only for administrative and operational purposes having a direct
bearing upon radioactive waste disposal activities, not on "the construction or
expansion of any facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly
139. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Compay v United States, 42 Fed C1 448 (1998).
140. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company v United States, 42 Fed Cl 582 (1998).
141. Leigh Ann Marshall, Mushrooming Nclear-Waste Costs, Chi Trib 18 (Nov 17, 1998).
142. Northern States Power Company v United States, 43 Fed Cl 374 (1999).
143. Id at *9-*14.
144. Id at*13.
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authorized by this or subsequent legislation."'145 Even if there were statutory
authority, the extent of their liability would wipe out the Fund and any money
with which to eventually build a permanent repository. Secretary Richardson
estimates that the $8.5 billion potential liability from this first wave of suits alone
is more than the $20 million needed to complete Yucca Mountain. 46 The sooner
an interim solution is provided, the better for the taxpayers. The DOE needs to
make some effort to curtail their liability, since it is also uncertain how they will
pay for their current damages.
B. UTILITIEs' LIABILm Es
While evaluating their near-term strategies for dealing with the DOE's delay,
the utilities need to take the responsibility associated with title of the waste into
consideration. The NWPA states that "[d]elivery, and acceptance by the Secre-
tary, of any high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel for a repository
constructed under this part shall constitute a transfer to the Secretary of title to
such waste or spent fuel."' 147 Without the obligation to take title to the waste, the
DOE is under no duty to accept it. The NWPA also notes that "the generators
and owners of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have the pri-
mary responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to pay the costs of the
interim storage of such waste and spent fuel untilsuch waste and spentfuel is accepted
by the Secretary of Energy"(emphasis added).148 The utilities thought this duty
would be shifted to the DOE upon the January 1998 deadline. The court's split
liability plan, however, leaves the title with the utilities. Therefore, the utilities are
still responsible for providing for and paying the costs of interim storage of such
waste. Given the DOE's current liability for damages, however, the utilities may
be able to recoup their costs that occur afterJanuary 31, 1998.
Retaining title to the waste also attaches liability for accidents associated with
it In a suit involving a contractor who breached his duty to remove and dispose
of spent nuclear fuel, the court noted that "[t]he significance of having DOE
take title to the spent fuel is that the contracting party can thereby rid itself of
any further financial responsibility in connection therewith, and particularly of
risks associated with the operation of the government repository."'149 The utilities
currently retain all of these responsibilities as well, and will take precautions to
prevent eruptions of such liabilities.
These precautions may be taken to an extreme, however, resulting in a moral
hazard. This can occur if DOE's damages for the delay entail paying for the
near-term strategy of the utilities' choice. If industry is overly protected by the
145. 42 USC § 10222(d).
146. Nuclear Waste Storage (Yucca Mountain): Congressional Testimony Before the House Subcomm on
Energy and Power, (statement of Bill Richardson, Secretary of the Dept of Energy), 1999 WL
8085516 (Mar 12, 1999).
147. 42 USC 10143.
148. 42 Usc 10131(a)(5).
149. Florida Power and Light Co. v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 597 F Supp 1456, 1459-60 (ED Va
1984).
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DOE, the utilities may have an incentive to overcompensate and spare no ex-
pense-even to the point of "gold-plating". So long as they justify their option
as the safest one possible, they may be able to simultaneously cover their liabili-
ties while making DOE pay more, perhaps resulting in an economic waste. This
may be avoided by allowing the DOE to provide input on the choice of remedia-
tion with the NRC serving as the necessary objective reviewer.
C. OTHER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
After analyzing three other possible outcomes to this dilemma, the current
split, even with its problems, can be viewed as the best alternative to facilitate
attempts at near-term strategies for the waste. First, the court could have ruled
for DOE on both tide and disposal. To do so, however, would provide unjusti-
fied special treatment to the government while eroding the trust of private play-
ers of government contracts. The utilities relied on the DOE's promise, and the
Court should enforce that. This position has been substantiated with the Su-
preme Court ruling, U.S. v Winstar, which ruled for a failed thrift company which
suffered losses after the government broke its promise of favorable regulatory
treatment during the Savings and Loan crisis. 50 Although the government is
providing Yucca Mountain as a large subsidy for the utilities, they are also bene-
fiting from fees generated by the utilities, the potential positive reputational ef-
fects, and the certainty of retaining uniform safety standards and oversight of the
nation's waste. Even this generous a commitment, however, may not justify full
absolution for delays.
A second option would have been to rule for the utilities on both tide and
disposal. In that scenario, however, each of the individual utility sites could be
instantaneously converted into mini-DOE sites with no incentive on the utilities
to take precautions with the waste. Any and all liabilities fall on the DOE, and
the utilities might have been able to demand that the waste be immediately re-
moved from their sites. The potential for safety problems is enhanced during
transitional stages, especially in this case where there is no available interim or
permanent repository ready to retain the waste.
A third alternative would have been to split the liability in the other direction:
holding DOE liable for not taking tide, but delaying imposition of a disposal
obligation until a repository is operational. It is more likely that the courts may
have mandated DOE to actually take tide to the waste in this scenario. This
could set the stage for another unfavorable situation where the utilities are still
responsible for providing for and paying for the costs of interim storage, but the
DOE is liable for any accidents that result. Utilities' efforts to minimize costs
may result in enhanced threats to safety and needless financial strain on the
DOE.
Therefore, by leaving tide with the utilities, but holding DOE liable for their
disposal obligation, the D.C. Circuit's current decision has placed the proper
incentives on the two parties to ensure a safe, near-term treatment of the excess
150. U,,itedStates v Winstar. 518 US 839, 116 S Ct 2432 (1996).
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wastes. Both parties are persuaded to sacrifice their political positions about
Yucca Mountain for the sake of near-term action. DOE can instead focus on
ending its liability through an interim solution and the utilities are still provided
with an incentive to ensure the safety of the measures.
V. OPTIONS FOR NEAR-TERM ACTION
This split liability has also created incentives for both parties to cooperate to-
wards limiting these liabilities. But since the courts have provided little guidance
in specifying how the remedies would work, continued negotiation will occur.
Aside from citing the Standard Contract as providing "adequate equitable reme-
dies," open issues focus on what remedies are available?, who will decide which
remedy is chosen?, and what criteria should be used to select the proper remedy?
The Claims Court in Northern States Power Company attempted to fill in the blanks
left open by the court in Indiana Michigan. This is the first court determination of
the remedies that an operating nuclear power plant can expect in the waste-
storage impasse.'5s After their holding, the utilities are now forced to negotiate
with DOE to change waste storage fees.
Four other basic remedy alternatives exist which can be broken down into two
categories: off-site and on-site. Off-site solutions focus on the construction of an
interim dry-cask storage aboveground. In addition to specific problems, these
off-site storage solutions involve additional transportation concerns not associ-
ated with on-site strategies. In Northern States I, the court refused to mandate that
DOE establish an interim storage site. If DOE's liability can only be ended by
emplacement in an interim or permanent repository, DOE may have an incen-
tive to pursue these offsite options. However, successful operational status of an
interim facility will also trigger DOE's obligation to take title to the waste.
The decisive issue within off-site storage focuses on whether this would be at
Yucca Mountain or some other location. The utilities will probably continue to
push for off-site solutions in order to get the problem off of their land. Addi-
tionally, some pro-nudear groups believe that even a relatively small storage
facility might provide an important demonstration of DOE's waste management
system and help overcome institutional barriers to a permanent repository.
Unless the latest legislative proposals prove more successful, an interim site at
Yucca Mountain faces the steepest opposition. On behalf of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, Secretary Richardson has again opposed Congress' most recent
push for interim storage, H.L 45, citing both (1) the costs of construction and
transport that detract from the 20 million still needed to complete Yucca Moun-
tain and (2) the lack of relief for DOE's current liability.52 Fortunately, the Vi-
ability Assessment was not enough to outweigh the Administration's concerns.
Senator Thompson has noted, however, that, "It seems often that when we
151. John J. Fialka, Court Dismisses Northern States Power's Suit Against DOE in Nuckar-Waste
Case, WSJ (Apr 8, 1999), 1999 WL-WSJ 5447605.
152. Statement of Bill Richardson (cited in note 146).
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agree with a decision, it is based on scientific evidence, and when we disagree, it
is based on politics."'51 3 Only time will tell whether it is science or politics that
ultimately guides the decisions surrounding Yucca Mountain.
In addition to the de facto concerns mentioned previously, NWPA currently
does not allow for the siting of an "interim" facility until approval has been
granted for a permanent site. This is to ensure that a "temporary" site does not
become a de facto permanent one. Furthermore, the interim site cannot be lo-
cated in the same state as the permanent facility, a provision demanded by Ne-
vadans angry at being host state for a permanent repository.5 4 Such a violation
of NWPA's original ethical principles would only heighten the opposition and
stall the efforts for a permanent repository.
A second off-site alternative is to build an interim site at another location. For
instance, a consortium of eight nuclear power companies have contracted with
the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Indian Tribe to store more than 10.4 mil-
lion spent fuel rods on the Goshute Reservation in Utah.55 This temporary stor-
age facility has been strongly contested by Utah governor, Mike Leavitt. Express-
ing NIMBY concerns similar to the state of Nevada, Governor Leavitt has un-
dergone a series of aggressive tactics designed to prevent this flow of waste into
his state. Not only is he attempting to swap state and federal lands, but even
requested designations for wilderness in order to create a virtual island that is
impenetrable to shipments. 5 6 This type of response, in addition to environ-
mental justice problems, and incompatibilities between the geology of the of-
feror's site and the scientific qualifications for interim storage, demonstrate the
low probability of this alternative.
Given the bureaucracy of the government, even if an interim site could be
agreed upon, it would take time before it is operational. Therefore, provided that
the government receive a curtailment of its liability, it is most likely that DOE
will be paying for an on-site remedy. On-site solutions include (1) the expansion
of storage in the cooling ponds through re-racking; or (2) constructing additional
dry cask storage for those rods which have already cooled. Still undecided, how-
ever, is whether the DOE would provide these services or pay monetary dam-
ages so that the utilities can do it themselves.
Re-racking involves both technical and legal obstacles. By re-racking without
expanding the physical capacity of the pools, the spent fuel rods are invariably
moved closer together. In Potomac Alliance v United State Nuclear Regulatogy Commis-
sion, the NRC approved re-racking of rods from 21 inches apart to 14 inches
apart.157 Although space-saving, this solution can increase the risk of accidents.
Mary Olsen of the Nuclear Information Resource Service warns of the criticality
153. Cong Rec S2979 (Apr 8, 1997) (statement of Senator Thompson).
154. 42 USC § 10155(a)(2).
155. Opposition to High Level Nuclear Waste Storage (visited Jan 20, 1999) <http://www.
eq.state.ut.us/HLWFACT.HTM>.
156. William Claiborne, Utah Resisting Tribe's Nuclear Dump; On a Reservation Ringed by Hazrds,
Indians See Jobs, Money in Radioactive Rods, Wash Post (Mar 2, 1999).
157. Potomac Alliance v United State Nuclear RegulatoO, Commission, 682 F2d 1030, 1033 n7 (DC
Cir 1982).
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in fuel pools that is more likely as the rods get closer.158 She alludes to a miscal-
culation in the Millstone plant in Connecticut that brought it close to critical-
ity.
1 59
Varied state laws and NRC regulations can also present a problem. States such
as Michigan and Wisconsin have passed laws that limit the ability of a utility to
expand on site.160 The utilities would also have to get the proposal past the
NRC's licensing requirements. The NRC is currently considering issuance of an
amendment to the Union Electric Company for operation of its nuclear power
plant in Missouri. In deciding, the NRC looks at the alternatives available to the
utility and the environmental impacts of each. In January of 1999, the NRC al-
lowed reracking of the spent fuel pools to increase their storage capacity to 2642
fuel assemblies which would maintain the plant's capacity to accommodate the
plant's needs until 2024.161 But not all utilities are this fortunate.
The second on-site solution is to construct a dry cask storage system. Since
this is costlier and requires a more extensive regulatory maze, utilities instead opt
to re-rack in their pools if they can. Only eight states currently have 10 utilities
with dry rack storage.162 Yet some utilities, like CoinEd, say it will start running
out of alternative storage space in 2001.163 This will lead to a complicated timing
dance between on-site expansion, Yucca Mountain feasibility, and limits on utili-
ties' cooling pools capacity.
After analyzing these alternatives, expansion of on-site storage appears to have
the best fit with the available criteria. The NWPA finds that "persons owning
civilian nuclear power reactors have the primary responsibility for providing
interim storage.. .by maximizing, to the extent practical, the effective use of
existing storage facilities at the site...and by adding on new onsite storage
capacity in a timely manner where practical." 164 Therefore, within the range of
safety, pools should be re-racked to provide more room for waste. But many
sites have already re-racked to increase storage at least once before. 65 For those
that for some reason prevented from re-racking, the next best alternative would
be construction of on-site dry storage. It provides the same benefits as off-site
interim storage without the transportation concerns. The NWPA dearly
indicates that "[i]n selecting methods of providing storage capacity.. .the
Secretary shall consider the timeliness of the availability of each such method
and shall seek to minimize the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, the public
158. Francis and Joanna Macy, The Poitics of Nuclear Waste-An Interview with Magy Olsen
(Spring 1994) <http://www.nonukes.org/r06polnu.htm>.
159. Id.160. Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Opposition to High Level Nuclear Waste Storage
(visited Jan 20,1999) <http://www.eq.state.ut.us/HLWFACT.HTM>.
161. 64 Fed Reg 2687.
162. Statement of Bill Richardson (cited in note 146); Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC
Dy Spent FuelStorage Licensees, <http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/drycask/appendh.htm> (visited Apr
17, 1999).
163. Basil Talbott, CornEd Races Clock Over Waste Fadlity, Chi Sun-Times (Oct 8, 1997).
164. 42 USC § 10151(a)(1).
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minimize the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, the public health and safety
impacts, and the costs.' 66
In following this statutory mandate, on April 12, 1999, Secretary Richardson
proposed an offer to voluntarily take title to the waste in exchange for the termi-
nation of the utilities' litigation and claims. 67 This new turn of events simultane-
ously demonstrates the flexibility of DOE's efforts to mitigate the problem and
their determination not to transport the waste until the permanent destination is
determined. The decisions in Indiana Michigan and its successors that refused to
mandate disposal provided the DOE with this bargaining power in subsequent
negotiations. Although there is a broad range of variations on such a settlement
which involve allocating liability, financial, and operational responsibilities, the
Secretary noted that "the cost of taking title appears to be minimal compared to
the potential cost of damages."'1 68 This additional offer by the DOE to take title
to the waste and pay for the costs associated with on site storage just may be
enough to convince the utilities to accept the continual presence of the waste on
their individual sites.
CONCLUSION
Many people doubt the actual feasibility of Yucca Mountain as a permanent
solution to the nation's nuclear waste problems. But even those who are confi-
dent in its eventual operation cannot deny that eleven years of uncertainty re-
main. The costs of such uncertainty not only harm the nuclear industry and in-
crease the rate of early shutdowns, but also breed fear and discontent in the pub-
lic at large. Despite general agreement on the need to mitigate the problems that
Yucca Mountain's inoperation has caused, both the utilities and the DOE are
finding it hard to look beyond long-term disposal at Yucca towards the more
pressing dilemma of interim storage.
The D.C. Circuit's decisions have provided the needed incentive for the DOE
and the industry to deal with the realities of the nuclear waste situation. Perhaps
by placing both DOE and the utilities at risk by sharing the liability for title and
disposal, Indiana-Michigan may provide some leverage for them to make a com-
promise. Before, an interim solution was seen as a failure for both DOE and the
utilities. For DOE, interim solutions signaled a failure to provide tangible bene-
fits to justify the large investment in Yucca Mountain and enhance their reputa-
tion by solving the nuclear waste problem. For the utilities, interim solutions
signal failure to overcome the growing obstacles to the future of the nuclear
power industry. Now that the Court has intervened, it can be used as a type of
scapegoat-providing the needed impetus for an interim solution without allow-
ing either side to claim a complete victory or failure. Once a safe and viable in-
terim solution can be negotiated between the utilities and the DOE, the nation's
166. 42 USC § 10155(a)(3).
167. Statement of Bill Richardson (cited in note 146).
168. Id.
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time, money, and other resources can be filly devoted to an accurate determina-
tion of a long-term solution to nuclear waste.

